Conflicts of interest have an erosive effect on trust in science, damaging first the attitude of the public toward scientists and their research, but also weakening the trusting interdependence of scientists. Disclosure is recognized as the key tool for management of conflicts, but rules with sanctions must be improved, new techniques for avoidance of financial conflicts by alternative funding of evaluative research must be sought, and there must be new thinking about institutional conflicts of interest. Our profession is education, and (...) both the public and research professionals of all ages would benefit from greater understanding of how science should and does work. (shrink)

This volume brings Cassirer s work into the arena of contemporary debates both within and outside of philosophy. All articles offer a fresh and contemporary look at one of the most prolific and important philosophers of the 20th century. The papers are authored by a wide array of scholars working in different areas, such as epistemology, philosophy of culture, sociology, psychopathology, philosophy of science and aesthetics.".

We show that there is a [Formula: see text]-model of second-order arithmetic in which the choice scheme holds, but the dependent choice scheme fails for a [Formula: see text]-assertion, confirming a conjecture of Stephen Simpson. We obtain as a corollary that the Reflection Principle, stating that every formula reflects to a transitive set, can fail in models of [Formula: see text]. This work is a rediscovery by the first two authors of a result obtained by the third author in [V. (...) G. Kanovei, On descriptive forms of the countable axiom of choice, Investigations on nonclassical logics and set theory, Work Collect., Moscow, 3-136 ]. (shrink)

We define a class of functions, the descent recursive functions, relative to an arbitrary elementary recursive system of ordinal notations. By means of these functions, we provide a general technique for measuring the proof-theoretic strength of a variety of systems of first-order arithmetic. We characterize the provable well-orderings and provably recursive functions of these systems, and derive various conservation and equiconsistency results.

The continuum function αmaps to2α on regular cardinals is known to have great freedom. Let us say that F is an Easton function iff for regular cardinals α and β, image and α<β→F≤F. The classic example of an Easton function is the continuum function αmaps to2α on regular cardinals. If GCH holds then any Easton function is the continuum function on regular cardinals of some cofinality-preserving extension V[G]; we say that F is realised in V[G]. However if we also wish (...) to preserve measurable cardinals, new restrictions must be put on F. We say that κ is F-hypermeasurable iff there is an elementary embedding j:V→M with critical point κ such that H)Vsubset of or equal toM; j will be called a witnessing embedding. We will show that if GCH holds then for any Easton function F there is a cofinality-preserving generic extension V[G] such that if κ, closed under F, is F-hypermeasurable in V and there is a witnessing embedding j such that j≥F, then κ will remain measurable in V[G]. (shrink)

People often think about how things could have been better or worse. People make these upward and downward comparisons in different situations and with differing emotional consequences. We investigated whether the direction of counterfactual comparisons affects people’s judgements of counterfactual closeness. In four preregistered experiments (N = 2,142), participants saw vignettes where agents lost or won a luck-based game. In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, participants judged counterfactual closeness in two ways: if a counterfactual outcome almost happened, and if it (...) easily could have happened. These judgments were affected by different factors, but did not substantially differ based on the direction of comparison. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants predicted agents’ emotions – whether losers would be sad, winners would be happy, and whether both would be surprised by the outcome. Emotion predictions showed similar patterns regardless of whether agents lost or won. Participants predicted stronger emotional reactions when the prior probability of the counterfactual outcome was high rather than low, though this effect was somewhat stronger when agents lost. Together, these findings join recent work in suggesting that Almost and Easily judgments tap into distinct forms of counterfactual closeness, and also suggest this distinction is robust to the direction of counterfactual reasoning. (shrink)

Young children’s failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247–254]. We tested (...) this model with an ‘avoidance false belief task’ in which subjects predict the behavior of a character, who wants to avoid an object but who is mistaken about which of three locations it is in. The task has two equally correct answers—in seeking to avoid the location where she mistakenly believes the object to be, the character might equally go to the location where the object actually is, or to the remaining empty location. However, the model predicts that subjects will prefer one of these answers, selecting the object’s actual location over the empty location. This bias was confirmed in a series of five experiments with children aged between 4 and 8 years of age. A sixth experiment ruled out two rival explanations for children’s biased responding. Two further experiments found the opposite bias in adults. These findings support one selection model as an account of belief-desire reasoning in children, and suggest that a different model is needed for adults. The process of selecting contents for mental state attributions shows a developmental shift between 8 years of age and adulthood. (shrink)

Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed (...) to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing', 'healing', and 'habilitating'. This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate. (shrink)

A significant body of research has emerged in order to better understand unethical behavior at work and how gender plays a role in the process. In this study, we look to add to this literature by exploring how perpetrator gender influences reactions to distinct types of unethicality. Rather than viewing unethical behavior as a unitary construct, where all forms of lying, cheating, and stealing are the same, we integrate theories and concepts from the criminal justice and moral psychology literatures to (...) categorize certain unethical behaviors as either impulsive or premeditated. Given the agentic nature of premeditated unethical behavior, we draw from role congruity theory to predict that women will be punished more severely than men for their role incongruous actions. Impulsive unethical behavior, on the other hand, will be less likely to elicit perceptions of congruity or incongruity, leading to less of a gender effect. Results from three studies sampling both undergraduates and working adults in the United States, Singapore, and South Korea showed that participants were more likely to associate premeditated unethical behavior with a male perpetrator because it was seen as less feminine, and female perpetrators who engaged in premeditated unethical behavior received more severe punishment than male perpetrators due to the perceived role incongruity of their actions. Implications are discussed as well as possible limitations and directions for future research. (shrink)

We study the first-order consequences of Ramsey’s Theorem fork-colourings ofn-tuples, for fixed$n, k \ge 2$, over the relatively weak second-order arithmetic theory$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0$. Using the Chong–Mourad coding lemma, we show that in a model of$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0$that does not satisfy$\Sigma ^0_1$induction,$\mathrm {RT}^n_k$is equivalent to its relativization to any proper$\Sigma ^0_1$-definable cut, so its truth value remains unchanged in all extensions of the model with the same first-order universe.We give a complete axiomatization of the first-order consequences of$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0 + \mathrm {RT}^n_k$for$n \ge (...) 3$. We show that they form a non-finitely axiomatizable subtheory of$\mathrm {PA}$whose$\Pi _3$fragment coincides with$\mathrm {B} \Sigma _1 + \exp $and whose$\Pi _{\ell +3}$fragment for$\ell \ge 1$lies between$\mathrm {I} \Sigma _\ell \Rightarrow \mathrm {B} \Sigma _{\ell +1}$and$\mathrm {B} \Sigma _{\ell +1}$. We also give a complete axiomatization of the first-order consequences of$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0 + \mathrm {RT}^2_k + \neg \mathrm {I} \Sigma _1$. In general, we show that the first-order consequences of$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0 + \mathrm {RT}^2_k$form a subtheory of$\mathrm {I} \Sigma _2$whose$\Pi _3$fragment coincides with$\mathrm {B} \Sigma _1 + \exp $and whose$\Pi _4$fragment is strictly weaker than$\mathrm {B} \Sigma _2$but not contained in$\mathrm {I} \Sigma _1$.Additionally, we consider a principle$\Delta ^0_2$-$\mathrm {RT}^2_2$which is defined like$\mathrm {RT}^2_2$but with both the$2$-colourings and the solutions allowed to be$\Delta ^0_2$-sets rather than just sets. We show that the behaviour of$\Delta ^0_2$-$\mathrm {RT}^2_2$over$\mathrm {RCA}_0 + \mathrm {B}\Sigma ^0_2$is in many ways analogous to that of$\mathrm {RT}^2_2$over$\mathrm {RCA}^*_0$, and that$\mathrm {RCA}_0 + \mathrm {B} \Sigma ^0_2 + \Delta ^0_2$-$\mathrm {RT}^2_2$is$\Pi _4$- but not$\Pi _5$-conservative over$\mathrm {B} \Sigma _2$. However, the statement we use to witness failure of$\Pi _5$-conservativity is not provable in$\mathrm {RCA}_0 +\mathrm {RT}^2_2$. (shrink)

There are approximately one million cases oftype 1 diabetes in the US, and the incidenceis increasing worldwide. Given that two-thirdsof cases present in childhood, it is criticalthat prediction and prevention research involvechildren. In this article, I examine whethercurrent research methodologies conform to theethical guidelines enumerated by the NationalCommission for the Protection of Human Subjectsof Biomedical and Behavioral Research, andadopted into the federal regulations thatprotect research subjects. I then offer twopolicy recommendations to help researchersdesign studies that conform to these ethicalrequirements.

This chapter focuses on John Rawls's recent approach to liberal political legitimacy. His views on reasonableness and rationality are considered. It is argued that Rawls's legitimation pool for political liberalism is defined precisely in such a way as to exclude those whose prior commitments would lead them to reject political liberalism. The challenge for Rawls is to find good but politically independent reasons for eliminating so-called unreasonable people from the legitimation pool.

This paper inquires the ways in which paper folding constitutes a mathematical practice and may prompt a mathematical culture. To do this, we first present and investigate the common mathematical activities shared by this culture, i.e. we present mathematical paper folding as a material reasoning practice. We show that the patterns of mathematical activity observed in mathematical paper folding are, at least since the end of the nineteenth century, sufficiently stable to be considered as a practice. Moreover, we will argue (...) that this practice is material. The permitted inferential actions when reasoning by folding are controlled by the physical realities of paper-like material, whilst claims to generality of some reasoning operations are supported by arguments from other mathematical idioms. The controlling structure provided by this material side of the practice is tight enough to allow for non-textual shared standards of argument and wide enough to provide sufficiently many problems for a practice to form. The upshot is that mathematical paper folding is a non-propositional and non-diagrammatic reasoning practice that adds to our understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the epistemic force of mathematical proof. We then draw on what we have learned from our contemplations about paper folding to highlight some lessons about what a study of mathematical cultures entails. (shrink)

Author note: Penny A. Weiss, Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, is the author of Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics. Marilyn Friedman, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, is the author of What Are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory.

The subtle, almost ineffable, and ineffable cardinals were introduced in an unpublished 1971 manuscript of R. Jensen and K. Kunen. The concepts were extended to that of k-subtle, k-almost ineffable, and k-ineffable cardinals in 1975 by J. Baumgartner. In this paper we give a self contained treatment of the basic facts about this level of the large cardinal hierarchy, which were established by J. Baumgartner. In particular, we give a proof that the k-subtle, k-almost ineffable, and k-ineffable cardinals define three (...) properly intertwined hierarchies with the same limit, lying strictly above “total indescribability” and strictly below “arrowing ω”. The innovation here is presented in Section 2, where we take a distinctly minimalist approach. Here the subtle cardinal hierarchy is characterized by very elementary properties that do not mention closed unbounded or stationary sets. This development culminates in a characterization of the hierarchy by means of a striking universal second-order property of linear orderings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Josiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher of Religion ed. by Christoph Seibert and Christian PolkeRobin FriedmanJosiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher of Religion Christoph Seibert and Christian Polke, editors. Mohr Siebeck, 2021.In October 2015, the Warburg Haus, Hamburg, held a conference on the American philosopher Josiah Royce that brought together German and American scholars. The papers given at the conference led to this new book, Josiah Royce: Pragmatist, Ethicist, Philosopher (...) of Religion. Edited by the German scholars Christoph Seibert and Christian Polke, the volume includes eleven essays, nine delivered at the 2015 conference, together with additional contributions by Seibert and Polke, the conference organizers.It is valuable to see contemporary German scholars engaging with Royce and to compare their approach with that of American scholars. Americans tend to approach Royce through the tradition of pragmatism in the company of William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey, and to minimize the metaphysics in Royce's thought and its idealistic influences. [End Page 116]The book has the goal of developing Royce's thought to show how its insights and concerns may be valuable for contemporary life, not only for scholars of differing philosophical traditions. In their Introduction, Seibert and Polke describe Royce as a "pragmatist of his own kind" (3) and identify three themes in his philosophy. The first is community, which was central to Royce from the beginning and, following his serious study of Peirce, "became the ultimate principle of both his metaphysics and his philosophy of life" (3). The second theme is religion, which, for Royce, involved the "search for the ultimate meaning of his own life, as well as that of his fellows' lives" (3). The third broad theme in Royce is ethics and a lifelong concern with the nature of the examined life. Royce developed his ethical philosophy from an original critique of moral skepticism to the "never-ending task of building communities within and through mankind by way of a critical spirit of true and mutual loyalty" (3). Among these three, the editors consider religion as the most important. They state: "[R]eligion is a very important theme of Royce's philosophy: one may even assume that it is the central subject, which implies that his philosophy may be properly understood only if it is regarded as a philosophy of religion" (8). The centrality of religion is apparent in the essays. Consideration here must be brief.The book's first section, "Bridging Two Continents: Royce between Pragmatism and Idealism," includes three broad-ranging essays that work toward a synthesis between pragmatism and idealism in the thought of Royce. Ludwig Nagl's contribution, "Toward a Global Philosophical Discourse on Religion," discusses Royce's posthumously published "Lectures on Modern Idealism." Nagl uses this work, together with Royce's adaption of Peirce, to help create a bridge between pragmatism and idealism. He further explores Royce's interest in Eastern religion to suggest how Royce's thought might support a broad philosophical study of religion, not restricted to Christianity. Co-editor Seibert's article, "The Ethical Nucleus of Reality," focuses on Royce's epistemology and his ethics, while touching briefly on religion. The essay shows how Royce combined pragmatic and idealistic threads from his earliest writings, with particular attention to his book The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (SM). Royce's SM is also central to the American philosopher Douglas Anderson's essay "What Philosophy Meant to Josiah Royce." In SM, Royce argues that philosophy constitutes a critical reflection on experience that may be practiced by every person, not only by professional philosophers. Anderson, however, also identifies and criticizes a more elitist, professional aspect in Royce's conception of philosophy. For Anderson, Royce's thought had a pragmatist dimension in that philosophy was a "voluntarily chosen attitude toward conducting our lives" (80). Royce's thought also was idealistic [End Page 117] in its recognition of the finite character of human life and in the search for the whole. Anderson writes that, for Royce, "to understand our experiences and to gain some control of our futures, we must see those experiences in their relations to all of what is—no easy task" (80).The book's second section includes... (shrink)

This paper discusses three research perspectives on political culture, civic culture and citizenship: the classic approach of Almond and Verba; contemporary analyses of citizenship referring to the book Civic Culture by Almond and Verba and oriented to the empirical description of social reality; and theoretical analyses of new relational sociology, oriented to the ontology and epistemology of social reality. The authors’ analysis leads to two conclusions. Firstly, it is necessary to combine these three approaches – relational social theory with empirical (...) analyses departing from methodological individualism. This requires conducting an empirical analysis, where the basic ‘analytical units’ – of collection, interpretation and generalization of data – are not separate but combined by relations and networks within which people act. Secondly, Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński’s statements are the best starting point for conducting such a new research programme. What is decisive is his systematic, theoretical interest in contemporary agency theories and relationality of citizenship, combined with innovative application of quantitative methods. (shrink)

E. T. Jaynes' resolution of Bertrand's paradox in terms of invariance principles is criticized. An experimental setup is considered which generates general solutions to Bertrand's problem by rotating a line around a point a distancer+d from a circle of radiusr. The general solution obtained is neither translationally nor scale invariant, but depends on the value ofr/d. Only in the limitr/d » 0, when the line is just translating across the circle, is the distribution translationally invariant and scale invariant. In this (...) limiting case the distribution found is just that obtained by Jaynes. (shrink)

A classic result of Baumgartner-Harrington-Kleinberg [1] implies that assuming CH a stationary subset of ω1 has a CUB subset in a cardinal-perserving generic extension of V, via a forcing of cardinality ω1. Therefore, assuming that $\omega_2^L$ is countable: { $X \in L \mid X \subseteq \omega_1^L$ and X has a CUB subset in a cardinal -preserving extension of L} is constructible, as it equals the set of constructible subsets of $\omega_1^L$ which in L are stationary. Is there a similar such (...) result for subsets of $\ omega_2^L$ ? Building on work of M. Stanley [9], we show that there is not. We shall also consider a number of related problems, examining the extent to which they are "solvable" in the above sense, as well as defining a notion of reduction between them. (shrink)

We consider properties of sets in an intuitionistic setting corresponding to large cardinals in classical set theory. Adding such ‘large set axioms’ to intuitionistic ZF set theory does not violate well-know metamathematical properties of intuitionistic systems. Moreover, we consider statements in constructive analysis equivalent to the consistency of such ‘large set axioms’.

This article aims to present how paper-folding activities were integrated into recreational mathematics during the 17th and the 18th centuries. Recreational mathematics was conceived during these centuries as a way not only to pique one’s curiosity, but also to communicate mathematical knowledge to the literate classes of the population. Starting with Leurechon’s 1624 Récréation mathématique, which did not contain any exercise concerning paper folding, we show how two other traditions—Dürer’s folded nets on the one hand and napkin folding on the (...) other hand—prompted and influenced the integration of folding within subsequent books and manuscripts, especially those of Georg Philipp Harsdörffer and Daniel Schwenter. In Germany, but also to a lesser extent in France, folding was henceforth re-conceptualised within recreational mathematics as a way to transmit geometrical knowledge. Following Harsdörffer, the paper will claim that practising folding activities enabled the acquiring of a geometrical knowledge, which was haptic rather than symbolical or merely visual. This tactility reflects the Baconian conception of science and scientific experiment; and the paper will try to illuminate how folding, by advancing practice and tactility via experiments, was representing these traditions and conceptions. (shrink)

The theory , axiomatized by the induction scheme for sharply bounded formulae in Buss’ original language of bounded arithmetic , has recently been unconditionally separated from full bounded arithmetic S2. The method used to prove the separation is reminiscent of those known from the study of open induction.We make the connection to open induction explicit, showing that models of can be built using a “nonstandard variant” of Wilkie’s well-known technique for building models of IOpen. This makes it possible to transfer (...) many results and methods from open to sharply bounded induction with relative ease.We provide two applications: the Shepherdson model of IOpen can be embedded into a model of , which immediately implies some independence results for ; extended by an axiom which roughly states that every number has a least 1 bit in its binary notation, while significantly stronger than plain , does not prove the infinity of primes. (shrink)

Many authors show how useful logic can be as a tool for building theories that can account for problems in the philosophy of religion, such as paradoxical assertions. As a consequence, one's philosophy of logic is crucial as well, since it determines which logics, from the set of available and constructible logics, one can use to build a theory. In this paper, we present the relatively recent debate between logical pluralism and monism because the positions in this debate determine which (...) logic(s) can, with justification, be applied to build a theory that addresses problems in the philosophy of religion. We begin by presenting the problem of paradoxical assertions and the debate over logical pluralism that bears on the addressing paradoxical assertions. We then canvass strategies for arguing in favor of logical monism, and pluralism; ultimately, we conclude that the Western tradition has reached a stalemate on this issue. We then turn our attention to the potential for Indian religious traditions to contribute to the debate. We present the five-step-syllogism from Nyāya-Hindu philosophy, the four corners of reasoning from Buddhist philosophy, and the seven-fold theory of predication from Jaina philosophy. The upshot of our presentation is to lay the groundwork for cross-traditional logical debate by identifying the ways in which Indian discussions of debate and dialogue relate to modern approaches to logic and the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy problemu egzystencjalnej komunikacji w sztuce i literaturze. Problemu, który został przedstawiony i zanalizowany w oparciu o klasyczne teksty S. Kierkegaarda, G.W.F. Hegla, F.W.J. Schellinga, z odniesieniem do polskich klasyków estetyki, choćby R. Ingardena, W. Tatarkiewicza czy St. Ossowskiego. W artykule nie zabrakło także stałych odniesień do takich postaci, jak Don Juan Mozarta, Faust Goethego oraz sędzia Wilhelm Kierkegaarda. Taki dobór autorów, jak i literackich postaci, pozwolił na zderzenie dwóch punktów widzenia na kwestię komunikacji – subiektywnej i obiektywnej. (...) Dzięki temu stało się możliwe udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie o możliwość komunikacji w chwili, gdy przedmiot komunikacji nie jest w pełni osiągalny. Odpowiedzi, którą było zrozumienie natury i funkcji, jaką ma do spełnienia sztuka i literatura. A co dało się ostatecznie streścić w formułach, iż sztuka naśladuje życie, lecz nim nie jest, a także, że przeżycie estetyczne, podobnie jak każde inne egzystencjalne przeżycie, da się jedynie w niewielkiej mierze wyrazić słowami. Prawda artysty wymyka się bowiem konceptualizmowi filozoficznemu, a możliwość egzystencjalnej komunikacji skłania go, by wyrażał siebie w obliczu najtrudniejszych pytań, jakie stawia mu los. Pytań o jego własne przeznaczenie i sens twórczości. Tak oto twórca, dla którego jego własne życie jest dziełem sztuki bądź artysta dokonujący wyboru języka znaków, zawsze wyrażają jakieś przesłanie. Zarówno to wzniosłe, jak i najbardziej prozaiczne, które karmi się zafascynowaniem powszednią egzystencją. Biorąc pod uwagę powyższy kontekst, treść artykułu sugeruje, że egzystencjalizacja poznania, która skupia uwagę na subiektywnej, podmiotowej percepcji świata, jest najwłaściwszym sposobem zbliżenia się do samego twórcy, jak i jego artystycznej aktywności. Rzecz jasna, odpowiada to długiej tradycji myślenia egzystencjalnego i możliwości wykorzystania metody egzystencjalnej komunikacji. (shrink)

Section 38 of Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics is of great interest. For Kant there attempts, uncharacteristically, to illustrate one of the central claims of his exceedingly abstract and general transcendental philosophy by means of a concrete example. The claim in question is stated as the conclusion of §36.

Van Rensselaer Potter was an American biochemist who worked in the McArdle Laboratory for Cancer Research at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. In 1970, in an article in this journal, Potter coined the term bioethics to combine a new discipline that combines biological knowledge with ethics. Potter wrote, “Ethical values cannot be separated from biological facts” (p. 127). His conception was broad-ranging: “We are in great need of a land ethic, a wild-life ethic, a population ethic, a consumption ethic, (...) an urban ethic, an international ethic, a geriatric ethic, and so on. All of these problems call for actions that are based on values and biological facts. All of them involve bioethics, and survival of the .. (shrink)

Feminists, communitarians, and other social theorists have raised numerous challenges to the very possibility of the ideal of personal autonomy and its alleged value. This chapter offers a negative defense of autonomy by responding to six critical challenges that have been or may be leveled against it. These are that autonomy-self-determination is impossible because there are no selves; autonomy is impossible because selves cannot “determine” themselves: human actions are merely links in chains of interpersonal interactions; autonomy is impossible because selves (...) cannot determine themselves: they cannot understand themselves accurately; autonomy is possible but not genuinely valuable, and may even be positively harmful, especially to socially subordinated or oppressed groups; autonomy is possible and genuinely valuable, but has been restricted in practice to elite social groups; and that autonomy is possible and genuinely valuable but can be, and has been, distorted in practice into something harmful. (shrink)

This chapter presents the author's basic account of autonomy, considering its social context and dimensions. It then explores the difference between a substantive and a content-neutral conception of autonomy, opting for the latter. This is followed by some thoughts about the prospects for autonomy under dangerous or oppressive conditions. The chapter concludes with some remarks about possible counterexamples to the conception of autonomy presented.